Civil Rights–Employment Discrimination–Voluntary Affirmative Action Allowed by Arnold, Carol S.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 3 Issue 2 Article 5 
1980 
Civil Rights–Employment Discrimination–Voluntary Affirmative 
Action Allowed 
Carol S. Arnold 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carol S. Arnold, Civil Rights–Employment Discrimination–Voluntary Affirmative Action Allowed, 3 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 481 (1980). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol3/iss2/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
NOTES
CIVIL RIGHTS - EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Voluntary Affirmative Action Allowed. United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with United
Steelworkers of America (USWA), Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical
Corporation (Kaiser) implemented an affirmative action plan
designed to eliminate racial imbalances in the company's almost
exclusively white craft work force. Kaiser and USWA set craft hir-
ing goals, and established on-the-job training programs to teach
unskilled production workers the skills necessary to become craft
workers. The plan reserved fifty percent of the openings in the
training programs for blacks and established dual seniority lists
from which black and white workers were to be selected alternately
on the basis of seniority in their respective races.
Brian Weber, a white worker at Kaiser's plant in Gramercy,
Louisiana, applied for the craft training program and was rejected
even though he had more seniority than the most junior black ac-
cepted. Weber brought a class action suit in the District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that the affirmative ac-
tion plan discriminated against white employees in violation of sec-
tions 703(a) and (d) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'
The district court held that the Kaiser-USWA plan violated
Title VII because it created a racial quota which was permissible
only when imposed by a court to remedy past discrimination. The
court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting Kaiser and the
USWA from denying Weber access to on-the-job training programs
on the basis of race.2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.8 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination did not con-
demn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action
plans. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to § 2000e-17 (1976).
2. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F.Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
3. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to achieve the inte-
gration of blacks into the mainstream of American society." Con-
gress intended Title VII of the Act to relieve the economic plight
of black Americans resulting from discrimination in employment.,
Section 703(a) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against or classify any individual in any
way which would deprive him of employment opportunities be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.s Section 703(c)
prohibits labor organizations from engaging in such practices.?
Section 703(d) specifically forbids discrimination in training
programs.8
Section 706(g) of Title VII sets out the remedies for violation
of the Act and permits the district courts to "order such affirma-
4. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
5. 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964).
6. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
7. Section 703(c) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership,
or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individ-
ual in violation of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976).
8. Section 703(d) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization,
or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training
or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission
to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other
training.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976).
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tive action as may be appropriate." Prior to the time Weber
reached the United States Supreme Court, nearly every circuit had
upheld court-ordered, race-conscious affirmative action as a rem-
edy within the scope of section 706(g). Such measures included
goals and quotas for hiring, promotion, and union membership;'
hiring, admission to training programs, and promotion on an
alternate one-white, one-black basis;" and other race-conscious
treatment.
2
Employers and unions had argued on appeal in the circuit
courts that these court-ordered, race-conscious remedies amounted
to preferential treatment which was impermissible under section
703(j) of Title VII,' 8 and they insisted that the type of affirmative
9. Section 706(g) of Title VII provides in part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
10. See, e.g., EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., 596 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1979); EEOC
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978);
United States v. Elevator Constructors Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976); Patterson v.
Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911
(1976); Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975); Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher,
504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Rios v. Steamfitters Local
638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Masonary Contractors Ass'n of Memphis, Inc., 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974); Asso-
ciated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 957 (1974); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354
(8th Cir. 1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 984 (1971); Local 53, Int'l Assoc. of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v.
Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
11. Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1978); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354
(8th Cir. 1973).
12. Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1978) (freeze on white hiring); United
States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973) (recruitment of minorities with
insufficient experience to qualify); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46,
471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) (issuance of one hundred work
permits to minorities); United States v. Sheetmetal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969) (publication that membership open to all).
13. Section 703(j) of Title VII provides in part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management com-
mittee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual
or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such
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relief available under 706(g) was limited by 7030). A majority of
the circuits rejected this view,14 holding that such remedies were
permissible under the grant of authority to the district courts
under 706(g) to apply "equitable" and broadly discretionary reme-
dies,15 and that section 703 defined violations, not remedies.1 6
Congress apparently approved the interpretation adopted by
the circuit courts in 1972 when it amended Title VII." During de-
bate on the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Senator
Ervin, who followed the view that 7030) forbade quota remedies,
proposed two amendments to the Act which would have specifi-
cally prohibited court imposed quotas to overcome the effects of
past discrimination."5 The Senate rejected both Ervin amendments
by a two-to-one margin.19 The rejection of the Ervin amendments
provided what the Third Circuit called "unusually clear evidence
that Congress approved the pre-1972 federal court interpretation
of the scope of §706(g) remedial power conferred by the 1964
Act.,,
20
The courts of appeal, however, placed limitations on the cir-
cumstances under which race-conscious affirmative action was per-
missible. Race-conscious hiring and promotion goals were upheld
only as interim goals rather than as permanent quotas to maintain
a particular racial balance."1 Courts considered racial quotas to be
individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin employed by any employer....
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(j) (1976).
14. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 915 (1978); United States v. Elevator Constructors Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir.
1976); Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (lst Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 910 (1975); Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443
F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. Sheetmetal Workers
Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
15. Rios v. Steanifitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
16. United States v. Elevator Constructors Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976).
17. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1976)).
18. United States v. Elevator Constructors Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012, 1019 (3d Cir. 1976).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1019-20.
21. An en banc Fifth Circuit decision stated: "[The district court] may, within the
bounds of discretion, order temporary one-to-one or one-to-two hiring ... or any other
form of affirmative hiring relief until the Patrol is effectively integrated." Morrow v. Crisler,
491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974). In an unusual decision, one
court upheld in principle a percentage goal which the union was ordered to meet by a cer-
484 [Vol. 3:481
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drastic reliefP which demanded a close scrutiny of the statistics.23
At least one court overturned a district court's order for quota re-
lief because the order was so overbroad as to constitute an abuse of
discretion. 4 As concern about "reverse discrimination" increased
in the late 1970's, some courts imposed quotas only where there
were no ascertainable victims of reverse discrimination, or where
the effects of reverse discrimination would be diffused among an
unidentifiable group of unknown, potential applicants rather than
upon an ascertainable group of easily identifiable persons.'5 Other
courts declined to impose race-conscious goals where the employer
had improved the racial balance in his work force after 1965 unless
there was a showing of "compelling need.'2
The courts of appeal generally refused to uphold racial quotas
in the absence of past discrimination in employment. Some courts
did not permit a race-conscious remedy in the absence of a judi-
cially determined Title VII violation,'7 although other courts up-
held quotas imposed under a consent decree 8 or upon a showing of
tain date. Rios v. Steamfitters Lpcal 638, 501 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1974). The Rios court distin-
guished between "quotas" and "goals" by stating that an order for a permanent racial bal-
ance was a "quota," and an interim, temporary order to achieve a particular percentage of
minorities was a "goal." Id. at 628 n.3.
22. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
920 (1976).
23. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
24. EEOC v. Local 14, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 553 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1977).
25. EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc., 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976);
Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975). Bridgeport Guardians and Kirk-
land were both decided under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 rather than under Title VII.
26. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 274 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 920 (1976).
27. Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 538 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1051 (1978); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 965 (1977); Watkins v. United Steel Workers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975);
Jersey Cent. Power v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
998 (1976); Waters v. Wis. Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
997 (1976); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973). The principle was summa-
rized in the Fifth Circuit opinion: "In the absence of prior discrimination, a racial quota
loses its character as an equitable remedy and must be banned as an unlawful racial prefer-
ence prohibited by Title VII, § 703(a) and (d)." Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
563 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979).
28. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 915 (1978); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Int'l, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
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underutilization of women and minorities in a proceeding under
Executive Order 11,246.29 The correction of general societal dis-
crimination, absent a judicial or administrative finding of specific
employment discrimination, was not sufficient to support a race-
conscious, court-ordered remedy.30
The requirement of past discrimination to justify race-con-
scious affirmative action placed employers and unions on the horns
of a dilemma.31 On the one hand, it appeared to be advantageous
for employers and unions to set up voluntary affirmative action
programs to eliminate discrimination and protect themselves
against suits by minority workers.82 The United States Supreme
Court appeared to support this type of voluntary affirmative action
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody when it declared that Congress
intended Title VII to act as a spur or catalyst to lead "employers
and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment
practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last
vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's
history."33 Several lower courts also stated that voluntary compli-
29. Exec. Order No. 11,246 requires all applicants for federal contracts to refrain from
employment discrimination and to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are
employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race,
color, religion, sex or national origin." Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 202(1) (1974),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). The Office of Federal Contract Compliance, the ad-
ministrative agency charged with enforcing Executive Order No. 11,246, provides in its regu-
lations that employers must set goals for hiring and promotion to overcome underutilization
of women and minorities. "Underutilization" is defined as having fewer minorities or women
in a particular job group than would "reasonably be expected by their availability." 41
C.F.R. § 60-2.11 (1979).
Courts have upheld race-conscious affirmative action plans devised under Executive Or-
der No. 11,246 in the absence of judicial determination of past discrimination. See, e.g.,
Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.
1972); Contractors As8'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
854 (1971). See also Schuwerk, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in The Dynamics of
Executive Power, 39 UNiv. or Cm. L.J. 723 (1972).
30. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub
nom.,' United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
31. See, e.g., EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., 596 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1979). There
the Eighth Circuit upheld a voluntary affirmative action program under a conciliation agree-
ment between the employer and the EEOC in the absence of a finding of racial discrimina-
tion. The court, however, noted that such programs had been attacked as reverse discrimi-
nation and that the current status of such systems was "doubtful to say the least." Id. at
814.
32. 57 N.C.L. Rav. 695 (1979).
33. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
NOTES
ance was preferable to court enforcement,"4 and some state and
district courts actually imposed an obligation to fashion affirmative
programs in the absence of a judicial finding of discrimination."
Two governmental agencies charged with ending employment
discrimination shared this preference for voluntary affirmative ac-
tion. In its affirmative action guidelines, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) took the position that an affirm-
ative action plan based on reasonable self analysis by the employer
or the union would protect the employer or union from a determi-
nation of reasonable cause in an EEOC proceeding.3 6 The Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs, which administers Execu-
tive Order 11,246 prohibiting discrimination by contractors dealing
with the federal government,3 7 required employers to set goals for
hiring and promotion to overcome underutilization of women and
minorities as determined by the contractor's work force analysis."
On the other hand, such voluntary affirmative action in the
absence of past discrimination exposed the employer and the union
to charges of reverse discrimination by whites.39 In Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,40 a highly publicized reverse
discrimination case, the United States Supreme Court held that
the University of California's voluntary affirmative action plan was
unconstitutional in that it violated the equal protection rights of
Alan Bakke, a white applicant to the University's medical school.
Bakke, however, was not dispositive of the issue of voluntary af-
firmative action by a private employer since the divided Bakke
Court 4 addressed affirmative action undertaken by a governmental
34. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir.
1974). In dictum, the Eighth Circuit observed: "[T]he presence of identified persons who
have been discriminated against is not a necessary prerequisite to ordering affirmative relief
in order to eliminate the present effects of past discrimination." Carter v. Gallagher, 452
F.2d 315, 330 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
35. Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F.Supp. 252 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Lindsay v. City of
Seattle, 548 P.2d 320 (Wash.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886 (1976).
36. EEOC: Affirmative Action Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. 1608 (1979). A determination of
reasonable cause to believe a discrimination charge is true enables the EEOC to make en-
deavors to eliminate the alleged discriminatory practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
37. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.6 (1978).
38. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11 (1978).
39. Cramer v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 415 F.Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976). The United
States Supreme Court has held that Title VII protects whites as well as blacks. McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
40. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke., 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
41. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court, which affirmed in part and
1980]
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employer in a context other than employment, and the case turned
on constitutional grounds rather than Title VII principles. The pri-
vate employer or union wishing to take voluntary race-conscious
affirmative action after Bakke was still faced with the dilemma of
either admitting past discrimination or facing reverse discrimina-
tion charges.42
It was this dilemma which the United State Supreme Court
addressed in United Steelworkers v. Weber."' The majority opin-
ion stated that Congress did not intend to prohibit all voluntary,
race-conscious affirmative action." The legislative history of Title
VII and the historical context out of which the Act arose, accord-
ing to the Court, made it clear that an interpretation forbidding all
race-conscious affirmative action would bring about a result com-
pletely at variance with the purpose of the Act.45 The majority rea-
soned that since the concern of Congress was "'the plight of the
Negro in our economy,'" the goal of the Civil Rights Act could not
be achieved unless the economic position of blacks improved.4
The Court pointed out that it would be ironic if Title VII were
construed to prohibit all voluntary, private efforts to abolish the
very patterns of racial segregation which triggered the Act.41
reversed in part. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun filed an opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun filed separate
opinions. Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part and filed an opinion in
which Justices Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist joined. Id.
42. Judge Wisdom summed up the dilemma in his dissent in the Fifth Circuit opinion
in Weber:
The employer and the union are made to walk a high tightrope without a net
beneath them. On one side lies the possibility of liability to minorities in private
actions, federal pattern and practice suits, and sanctions under Executive Order
11246. On the other side is the threat of private suits by white employees and,
potentially, federal action. If the privately imposed remedy is either excessive or
inadequate, the defendants are liable. Their good faith in attempting to comply
with the law will not save them from liability ...
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting), rev'd sub nom., United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See also
Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 450 F.Supp. 496 (D. Conn. 1978), where it was held that
the voluntary adoption of an affirmative action program did not insulate the employer from
a challenge of reverse discrimination. See also Note, Employment Discrimination-Weber
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.: Does Title VII Limit Executive Order 11246., 57
N.C. L. REv. 695 (1979).
43. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
44. Id. at 203.
45. Id. at 202.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 204
NOTES
The Court analyzed both the language and the legislative his-
tory of section 703(j) and concluded that Congress did not intend
to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action.48 The
language of section 7030) states that nothing shall be interpreted
to "require" any employer to grant preferential treatment; and the
majority pointed out that Congress could have written that noth-
ing shall be interpreted to "permit" voluntary affirmative action if
that had been its intent.
4 9
The majority opinion demonstrated that Congressional debate
revealed that section 7030) was designed to satisfy the concern of
opponents who feared that Title VII would lead to undue govern-
mental interference with business. The Court reasoned that prohi-
bition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious affirmative action
would defeat the desire of Congress to avoid undue federal regula-
tion of private business by increasing the power of the federal gov-
ernment and diminishing traditional management perogatives.50
The Court did not define the demarcation between permissible
and impermissible voluntary affirmative action plans in detail, but
it did explain why the Kaiser-USWA plan fell on the permissible
side of the line. First, the Court noted that the purposes of the
plan mirrored the purposes of the Act: both were designed to break
down old patterns of racial segregation, and both were intended to
open employment opportunities for blacks in occupations tradi-
tionally closed to them. 1 Second, the Court reasoned that the plan
did not unnecessarily interfere with the interests of white employ-
ees. The plan did not require the discharge of white workers and
their replacement with blacks; it did not create an absolute bar to
the advancement of white employees, since fifty percent of the
workers admitted to the training program were white; and it was
intended as a temporary measure not to maintain a racial balance,
but simply to eliminate an existing racial imbalance.2
The majority held that such an affirmative action plan was
permissible to correct a "conspicuous racial imbalance in tradition-
ally segregated job categories. '5 8 This stringent standard neverthe-
less does not foreclose future reverse discrimination suits alto-
48. Id. at 207
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 208.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 209.
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gether. Whites as well as blacks can still claim protection under
Title VII."
The Weber court emphasized the narrowness of its holding,
leaving a number of questions unanswered.a5 The opinion applies
to a race-conscious, voluntary affirmative action plan designed to
correct discrimination against blacks and does not reach similar
plans to eliminate discrimination against women, religious groups,
or other minorities." Whether the Weber rationale would apply to
a voluntary, race-conscious plan which operated to dilute existing
54. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). The Court states
that Weber is addressed to the issue of "whether Title VII forbids private employers and
unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial
preferences," a question the Court noted was expressly left open in McDonald. The Court
also observed that Weber's reliance on McDonald was misplaced. United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979).
One court has interpreted Weber as severely limiting the application of McDonald. In
Meyers v. Ford Motor Co., 480 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Mo. 1979), a white automobile dealer
brought suit against Ford Motor Co. to recover the amount of his initial investment after his
dealership failed. Relying on McDonald, the plaintiff alleged race discrimination in that
Ford had reimbursed a black dealer, but had denied reimbursement to him. The court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the McDonald prin-
ciple'was limited to "invidious and injurious discrimination." Weber, by contrast, was found
to be expandable "to allow benefits to be distributed by private employers in less than even-
handed fashion, at least where the purpose is benign with respect to the white person who
has been denied the benefits." Meyers v. Ford Motor Co., 480 F. Supp. at 899.
The fact that Weber does not preclude successful reverse discrimination suits is illus-
trated in Harmon v. San Diego Co., 477 F.Supp. 1084 (S.D. Cal. 1979), where the district
court held that the employer violated Title VII by refusing to hire a white male even though
the personnel manager believed a consent decree required him to appoint a female. The
court distinguished Weber on the grounds that in the case at bar there was no affirmative
action plan, the purpose of the employer's action was to comply with his understanding of a
decree rather than to break down old patterns of segregation, and the employer's view
created an absolute bar to any white male's advancement.
55. The Weber Court gave the word "voluntary" a broader meaning than the facts
required. The Kaiser-USWA plan was motivated by their concern that the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance would impose sanctions against them under Exec. Order No. 11,246. It
is therefore questionable whether the plan was truly "voluntary." Weber v. Kaiser Alumi-
num & Chem. Corp., 415 F.Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976). The Supreme Court, however, did not
limit its holding to these facts, and stated that the disposition of the case made considera-
tion of the point unnecessary. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 n.9 (1979).
Weber has been cited for its flexible definition of "voluntary" in a later case where an
employer agreed to a plan under threat of strike from the union. Tangren v. Wackenhut
Servs., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979). See also Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 608 F.2d
1319, 1343 (9th Cir. 1979).
56. Weber, however, has been cited in a case concerning alleged discrimination against
women and other minorities as well as blacks for the proposition that special efforts must be
taken to correct past inequities and injustices in employment patterns. See United States v.
New York, 475 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
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rights of white workers under a seniority system is not clear. 7
Since the decision is limited to voluntary, race-conscious affirma-
tive action undertaken by a private employer, the Court does not
reach constitutional violations that might result from such plans
voluntarily established by governmental employers; and Weber
does not overrule Bakke, which dealt with a voluntary affirmative
action program undertaken by a state supported educational
institution."
The Court does not address the procedural question of
whether the employer or the employee bears the burden of show-
57. Section 703(h) of Title VII provides in part: "Notwithstanding any other provision
of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
Although section 703(h) exempts bona fide seniority systems from the coverage of the
Act, retroactive seniority is a permissible remedy for past, post-Act discrimination in accor-
dance with the "makewhole" purpose of Title VII. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747 (1976). Voluntary affirmative action in the form of stepped-up seniority for blacks might
arguably be permissible under Weber.
However, the Supreme Court has also stressed the inviolability of existing contract se-
niority rights under a valid collective bargaining agreement. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 135 (1977). The Court has adopted the "rightful place" theory, under
which retroactive seniority is deemed merely to place the victim of discrimination in the
position he would have been but for the unlawful discrimination. Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Retroactive seniority is permissible under this theory only when
white workers are not displaced by blacks. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563
F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom., United Steel Workers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); United States v. Elevator Constructors Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012
(3d Cir. 1976). The Kaiser-USWA plan created a new training program and did not interfere
with pre-existing rights Brian Weber may have claimed under a seniority system. No rights
were taken away from white workers; rather, new rights were vested in both black and white
applicants for the training program. Given this fact situation, it is not clear whether Weber
would permit a voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action program that divested white
workers of existing seniority rights.
Weber nevertheless has been applied to uphold a voluntary affirmative action plan
which resulted in a seniority override in favor of minority workers in an existing seniority
system. The court in that case noted that the decision represented "an extension of the
Weber rationale, because here the issue of pre-existing seniority rights is squarely before
this Court." Tangren v. Wackenhut Serve. Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979).
58. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Weber, moreover, does not
disturb the Bakke prohibition against affirmative action designed to correct societal discrim-
ination. The Weber holding is limited not only to discrimination in employment, but to
discrimination in "traditionally segregated job categories." United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979).
Since Weber on its facts is limited to private employment practices, courts have de-
clined to apply its doctrine to cases involving state action. See Mosley v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 612 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1980); Spirit v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475
F.Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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ing that an affirmative action plan is designed "to eliminate con-
spicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job catego-
ries."' 9 It is not clear from the opinion whether the employer must
show that the plan does fall within the protected category or
whether the employee must show the plan is not protected under
Weber.
The Weber Court left open the question of what constitutes a
"conspicuous racial imbalance" that will justify a race-conscious,
voluntary affirmative action program. "Conspicuous racial imbal-
ance" clearly embraces more than an "arguable violation" of Title
VII10 and appears to include the Executive Order 11,246 standard
of "underutilization" of minorities.61 Weber apparently eliminates
the "strict scrutiny" and "compelling need" limitations set on
court-ordered affirmative action by the circuit courts."2 Since the
Weber Court adopts much the same reasoning as the EEOC affirm-
ative action guidelines, an employer or union appears to be safe in
applying the EEOC standard of "reasonable self analysis" before
undertaking a voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action
program. s
The impact of Weber will ultimately rest on its application by
the lower federal courts in employment discrimination cases." A
59. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979).
60. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun argued that voluntary affirmative action
should be granted only on an "arguable violation" of Title VII. United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 211 (Blackmun J., concurring). The "arguable violation" standard was
also supported by Judge Wisdom in his dissent in Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977). The arguable violation standard would require that an
employer or union impose voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action only when a prima
facie violation of Title VII could be established. Such a prima facie showing does not
amount to a violation of Title VII but creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination
which the employer or union can overcome. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Proponents of this arguable violation theory pointed out that since a prima facie inference
of discrimination does not amount to an admission of a Title VII violation, the employer or
union could justify a race-conscious affirmative action program without exposing himself to
liability in discrimination suits by black workers. See Note, Employment Discrimination-
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.: Does Title VII Limit Executive Order
11,246? 57 N.C. L. REV. 695 (1979). But see 12 GA. L. REV. 669 (1978).
61. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1978).
62. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); Patterson v. American
Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
63. 29 C.F.R. 1608 (1979).
64. Lower court decisions since Weber illustrate the sort of protection employers and
unions can expect under the Weber doctrine. In Detroit Police Officer's Ass'n v. Young, 608
F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), the court reversed the district court's finding that a voluntary
affirmative action plan providing for a fifty-fifty ratio of blacks and whites on the Detroit
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recent case out of Arkansas, Taylor v. Teletype Corp.,6" suggests
that Weber may be given a broad reading in the Eighth Circuit. In
Taylor, Judge Arnold cited Weber to support a finding that a
black plaintiff had established a prima facie case of racial discrimi-
nation; neither voluntary affirmative action nor reverse discrimina-
tion were at issue. Rather, the court relied on Weber for the Su-
preme Court's statement of the Congressional purpose behind the
Civil Rights Act of 1964." The impact of Weber thus may rest in
its reaffirmation of the commitment of our courts and legislature to
end racial discrimination in employment.
Carol S. Arnold
police force violated Title VII. The court noted that even in the absence of discrimination
which would give rise to legal liability, the test of whether a voluntary plan was permissible
under Weber was whether the action taken was consistent with the anti-discrimination pol-
icy of Title VII.
In Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979), the court held
against white male employees who challenged affirmative action provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement on Title VII grounds. Applying Weber, the court found that the
collective bargaining agreement's seniority override provision in favor of minority workers
mirrored the purposes of Title VII and did not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white
employees.
The court in United States v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 705 (E.D.
La. 1979) observed that in the light of Weber, the defendant could not argue that his adop-
tion of affirmative action programs would expose him to possible reverse discrimination
suits.
Weber has also been cited to support a finding of legality in a consent decree agreed
upon by both parties. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1979). The
Fourth Circuit nevertheless has made it clear that Weber does not command any affirmative
action not required by Title VII. Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702
(4th Cir. 1979).
Several courts have cited Weber for the proposition that voluntary affirmative action is
commendable and within the spirit of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., Hamilton v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 606 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1979); Shaw v. Library of Congress, 479 F. Supp.
945 (D.D.C. 1979).
65. Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 475 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
66. The opinion stated:
[Tihe Court is mindful of the Supreme Court's recent opinion in United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed. 2d 480
(1979). The Supreme Court referred in particular to the remarks of Senator Clark
during debate on the bill that included what was to become Title VII: high un-
employment among blacks "'is a social malaise and a social situation which we
should not tolerate. That is one of the principle reasons why this bill should
pass.'". . . Yet, 15 years after the passage of the Act, the problem is still with us.
Last year black unemployment was 129% higher than white unemployment....
Title VII may properly be construed with the purpose of Congress to redress that
inequity in mind.
Id. at 964.

